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ILLINOIS DENTISTS INCORPORATED?
INTRODUCTION

The authority for professionals to incorporate has long been
recognized in Illinois.1 While the trend nationwide has been
toward allowing all prefessionals to incorporate, an unusual
series of events in Illinois has curiously led to a different result
with regard to the field of dentistry.
The propriety'of permitting persons engaged in the practice
of dentistry to incorporate was first recognized in the Illinois
Medical and Surgery Act of 1909.2 This right remained unchanged until 1933 when the Illinois Legislature provided, in
section 18 (a) of the Dental Practice Act (hereinafter referred
to as the D.P.A.), that: "No corporation shall practice dentistry.
• . ."
This statutory restriction upon dentists withstood attempted invalidation on the grounds that such legislation was
4
special and therefore unconstitutional.
The D.P.A. was attacked as being special legislation in the
1935 case of Winberry v. Hallihan.5 The thrust of the attack
was that section 18 (a) of the D.P.A. applied only to the dental
profession, thus arbitrarily discriminating against individuals practicing dentistry. After first recognizing that it was
within the police power of the state legislature to insist upon
maintaining the personal liability of individual professionals,6
the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the General Assembly's
right to deny corporations the privilege of practicing any profession, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute stating:
The Legislature was not compelled to treat alike all those classes
[medical institutes and clinics, drug stores, optical and similar
professional establishments] and was not bound to strike at all
evils at the same time, in the same act, or in the same way. It
may deal with the different professions according to the needs of
society in relation to each profession. There is no basis for the
7
charge of an unconstitutional discrimination.
On September 15, 1969, the legislature enacted the Professional Service Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as
P.S.C.A.) 8 This statute allowed a corporation to render profes1
Act of June 11, 1909, § 18, [1909-10) Ill. Laws 282.
2
1d
3 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 72a (Act of July 7, 1933); § 1, [1933] Ill.
Laws 708 added § 18a to Act of June 11, 1909, § 1 et seq., r1909-10] Ill.
Laws 277.
4 Winberry v. Hallihan, 361 Ill. 121, 197 N.E. 552 (1935).
5 Id.

6 Id.

at 127, 197 N.E. at 555.
at 130, 197 N.E. at 557.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-1 et seq. (1971), eff. Sept. 15, 1969.

87 Id.
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sional services; and it purported to embrace all groups required
to be licensed or obtain other legal authorization, in order to
practice their profession.
The 1969 P.S.C.A. 10 ostensibly changed the law by allowing
corporations to engage in the practice of dentistry. Whether
this is a correct interpretation of the statute shall subsequently
be examined; but accepting the suggestion that the 1969 statute
repealed the D.P.A.'s 1933 prohibition, it would appear that in
1969 the legislature intended to allow corporations to practice
dentistry. However, in 1972, the legislature approved Public
Act 77-2713, an amendment to the D.P.A.," in order to conform
the penalties under that Act with the Uniform Code of Corrections. 12 The inconsistencies arising from this amendatory act
may be most consequential to those persons practicing dentistry,
who, since 1969, have incorporated or intend to incorporate their
practice. These statutory inconsistencies must be dealt with
either by the legislature or the judiciary in order to resolve the
apparent conflicts.
The purpose of this paper is merely to present the existing
conflicts and give various interpretations concerning them.
MAY DENTISTS INCORPORATE UNDER
THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION ACT?

At the time when the P.S.C.A. was approved, 13 a corporation was not prohibited from rendering most professional services.1 4 A statutory exception to this general rule was the prohibition against a corporation engaging in the practice of dentistry.12 Since the adoption of the P.S.C.A., however, dentists
have been incorporating their practices, and this course of action
has not yet been judicially challenged. It has been universally
assumed by the legal community that the P.S.C.A. repealed section 18 (a) of the D.P.A., thus authorizing dentists to incorporate.
Section 415-2 of the P.S.C.A. provides that:
It is the legislative intent to provide for the incorporation of
an individual or group of individuals to render the same professional service to the public for which such individuals are required
by law to be licensed or to obtain other legal authorization ...
Section 415-4 provides in part that:
This Act shall take precedence in the event of any conflict with
9 See text accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32 § 415-1 et seq. (1971).
1 ILL. REV. STAT., 1972 Supp., ch. 91, § 72a (Amended by P.A. 77-2713,
§ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973).
12 ILL. REV. STAT., 1972 Supp., ch. 38, § 1001-1-1 et seq.
13 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-1 et seq. (1971).
14See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
15 See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
"6ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-2 (1971).
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provisions of the Business Corporation Act or other laws ....
The provisions of this Act shall not be considered as repealing,
modifying or restricting the applicable provisions of law regulating the several professions except insofar as such laws are in
conflict with the provisions of this Act, however, the provisions
of this Act shall take precedence over any law which prohibits a
corporation from rendering any type of professional services. 7
The foregoing provisions apparently effectuated the repeal
of the prohibition of section 18(a) of the D.P.A. 18 In order to
substantiate this conclusion, it is necessary to examine certain

rules of statutory construction.
In order to be an express repeal, the act to be repealed must
be identified or designated in the repealing statute. 19 Thus, the
express general repealing clause of the P.S.C.A., to the effect that
all inconsistent prior enactments are repealed, 0 is not an express
repeal. It follows that the pertinent provisions of the P.S.C.A.
attempted to effectuate an implied appeal.
There is a presumption by the courts against implied re-

peals ;21 therefore, if the inconsistency between a later act and an
earlier one is not fatal to the operation of either, the two shall
stand together and no repeal will be effected.22 When a general
codification of the law is enacted which apparently repeals prior

special laws (although not special in the constitutional sense) one
authority on statutory construction, Sutherland, provides the following constitutional guidelines:
The enactment of a general law broad enough in its scope and
application to cover the field of operation of a special or local
statute will generally not repeal a statute which limits its operation to a particular phase of the subject covered by the general
law . . . . An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted
to statutes of the same general nature, since the legislature is
presumed to have known of the existence of prior special or particular legislation, and to have contemplated only a general treatment of the subject matter by the general enactment. Therefore,
where the later general statute does not present an irreconcilable
conflict the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in
effect as a qualification of or an exception to the general law.
However, since there is no rule of law to prevent the repeal of
a special by a later general statute, prior special or local statutes
may be repealed by implication from the enactment of a later
general statute where the legislative intent to effectuate a repeal
is unequivocally expressed. A repeal will also result by implica17 Id. at § 415-4 (emphasis added).
18 ILL. REV. STAT., 1972 Supp., ch. 91, § 72a.
19 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. 1A, § 23.08
(4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
20

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-4 (1971).

2t SUTHERLAND,
22 Id. § 23.09.

supra note 19, § 23.10.
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tion when a comprehensive revision of a particular subject is

promulgated ....23
Sutherland further states that:

The enactment of a code operates to repeal all prior laws upon
the same subject matter where, because of its comprehensiveness,
it inferentially purports to be a complete treatment of the subject
or where by express declaration in the code it is prescribed
the
24
sole governing statutory law upon that particular subject.

The P.S.C.A. is a general law granting authority to incorporate to any type of professional service. The legislature has
expressly stated its intent to repeal all prior inconsistent statutes ;25 and this expression impliedly includes section 18 (a) of the
D.P.A. which prohibits dentists from incorporating - clearly
inconsistent with the provisions of the P.S.C.A. Thus, it can
reasonably be inferred that the P.S.C.A., when it was passed,
effectuated the repeal of section 18 (a) of the 1933 D.P.A.
There is another possible interpretation of the P.S.C.A.
which, if employed, will result in an opposite conclusion. The
P.S.C.A. may be interpreted as providing only the means by
which a professional service may incorporate. Since the P.S.C.A.
does not enumerate the professional services includable in its
provisions, it may be inferred that the Act only intended to
provide a means by which a professional service may incorporate,
and not to change the law as to which professions may operate
as a corporation.
This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the language of section 415-4 which states that: "[T] he provisions of
this Act shall take precedence over any law which prohibits a
corporation from rendering any type of professional services.

'26

Since, when construing a statute, every word used by the
legislature must be given effect, it seems clear that the Illinois
Legislature intended to include the dental profession within the
provisions of the P.S.C.A. Dentistry is a profession as defined
by section 415-3.4,27 and as such, should not be excluded from
the operation of the P.S.C.A.
Therefore, it must be concluded that this latter interpretation is inconsistent with the general legislative purpose to allow
any type of professional service to operate as a corporate entity.
23
24

Id. § 23.15.
Id. § 23.14.

ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 32, § 415-4 (1971).
26 Id. (emphasis added).
27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-3.4 (1971) provides that:
25

'Professional Corporation' means a corporation organized under this
Act solely for the purpose of rendering one category of professional
service and which has as its shareholders, directors, officers, agents and
employees (other than ancillary personnel) only individuals who are
duly licensed by this State to render that particular category of professional service ....

(emphasis added).
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Thus, it appeared that the legislature had expressed its intent to repeal, and had effectuated the repeal, of section 18(a) of
the D.P.A.; and it may have been concluded that corporations
could engage in the practice of dentistry following September 5,
1969. However, subsequent legislative action seems to indicate
that the law with respect to dentistry has again changed direction.
18 (a) OF THE DENTAL PRACTICE ACT REVIVED
As was previously stated, the amendatory act of 1933
changed the 1909 Medical and Surgery Act by incorporating
therein the provisions of section 18(a) making it unlawful for
any person or persons to practice dentistry under the name of a
corporation, company, association or trade name. In 1969, the
P.S.C.A. was approved, and thus the law appeared to be settled
that corporations could engage in the practice of dentistry in
Illinois.
In 1972, however, the Illinois Legislature approved Public
Act 77-2713, "An Act to amend Sections . . . 18 (a) of 'An Act
to regulate the practice of dental surgery and dentistry in the
This amendatory act was passed
,-"28
State of Illinois
solely to conform the penalties established in section 18 (a) of the
D.P.A. to the Uniform Code of Corrections. The substantive
provisions of the 1933 Act remained unchanged. Rules of statutory construction seem to indicate that by amending the D.P.A.,
the legislature has reenacted the law prohibiting incorporation by
of the P.S.C.A. which gave
dentists, and has repealed that part
29
dentists the right to incorporate.
The reenactment of a statute which has been repealed . . .
by implication from later legislation upon the subject matter invalidates the previous repeal and restores the statute to effective
operation. Likewise, where a statute has been amended and
changed by a later enactment, the reaffirmation of the statute in
its original form operates to repeal any inconsistent amendments
and modifications which have been engrafted upon the statute
since its original enactment ....
The reenactment of a statute is a continuation of the law as it
existed prior to the reenactment insofar as the original provisions
are repeated without change in the reenactment. Consequently,
an intermediate statute which has been superimposed upon the
original enactment as a modification of its provisions is likewise
not repealed by the reenactment of the original statute, but is
construed as being continued in force to modify the reenacted
statute in the same manner that it did the original enactment.
However, this immunity from repeal is extended only to those
SECTION

P.A. 77-2713, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973.
"On the basis
SUTHERLAND, supra note 19, § 22.22 provides that:
that the latest declaration of the legislature prevails, the inconsistent provisions of the prior statute . . . are treated as repealed."
28
29
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provisions of intermediate acts which are consistent With the reenactment, and therefore, any provisions in the intermediate act
which are inconsistent with the reenactment are repealed.30
Thus, to the extent that the P.S.C.A. repealed the 1933
D.P.A., the P.S.C.A. is repealed and the D.P.A. reinstated. That
is to say, section 415-4 of the P.S.C.A. which gave "any type"
of professional service the right to incorporate is repealed to the
extent that it allowed dentists to incorporate. Public Act 77-2713
recites verbatim the language of section 18(a) of the D.P.A.
except as to the prescribed penalties; and it is obvious, as was
suggested earlier, that the language of the P.S.C.A. is entirely
inconsistent with the prohibitions of the D.P.A. Thus, in light
of the 1972 reenactment of section 18 (a), the P.S.C.A. no longer
affords to dentists the authority to incorporate.
Since amendatory statutes will not be given retroactive effect unless a contrary legislative intent is shown, 1 and since no
contrary intent is shown here, the amendatory act should not
affect those dentists who have incorporated prior to January 1,
1973, the effective date of the 1972 Act. However, it is now
well-advised to counsel dentists not to incorporate until further
legislative action has been taken.
The Constitutionality of Public Act 77-2713
As was noted earlier, the original section 18(a) of the
D.P.A. withstood attack as being special legislation in the case
32
of Winberry v. Hallihan.
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that such regulation was within the police power of the
state legislature and that the legislature was not compelled to
treat all classes of professionals alike.
It should be noted that when the Winberry case was decided,
there were no statutes either authorizing or prohibiting doctors,
optometrists, etc., from incorporating. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court had little difficulty in holding that the Act was not
special legislation.
Today, all professional services may incorporate except those
engaged in the practice of dentistry or dental surgery. Public
Act 77-2713 prohibits dentists from incorporating. The prohibitory statute was reenacted subsequent to the passage of the
general statute, the P.S.C.A., which affords "any type" of professional the right to operate in corporate form. Therefore, a
judicial attack under Article IV section 13 of the 1970 Illinois
30 Id. § 23.28-23.29 (emphasis added).
31 E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 622 (1940 ed.).
82

supra.

361 IM. 126, 197 N.E. 552 (1935).

See text accompanying note 5
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Though a strong presumption

prevails as to the constitutionality of a statute, a judicial attack
upon Public Act 77-2713, now chapter 91, section 72(a) of the
Illinois Revised Statutes, may be successful in securing a judicial
determination that the prohibitory legislation is arbitrarily discriminating.

CONCLUSION

As was mentioned at the outset, the question of whether
dentists may legally operate in corporate form must finally be
resolved either by further legislative action or by judicial construction, once the 1972 reenactment is constitutionally tested.
Until either of those two events occur, the status quo seems clear
dentists may not operate in the corporate form in Illinois.
Norman Kurtz

33 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970) provides that:
The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or
can be made applicable shall be a matter of judicial determination.

